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BOOK REVIEW
JAMES R. ELKINS*
A THEORY OF CRMNAL JUSTICE. By Hyman Gross. New York: Ox-
ford University Press. 1979.
What is a theory of criminal justice? Jerome Hall, an eminent
criminal law theorist, begins one of his treatises with the observa-
tion that "[a] theory of criminal law is constructed of a set of
ideas by reference to which every penal law can be significantly
'placed,' and thus explained." 1 A theory of criminal justice, then,
serves to systematize our knowledge of the way we devise and
administer state controlled sanctions for wrongdoing in society.
A reader may seek out a theory or theories of criminal justice
for a variety of reasons. In its broadest context, a theory of criminal
justice can be seen as part of a more general theory of law or legal
philosophy. A legal philosophy in turn constitutes a part of a more
comprehensive view of society. A reader interested in the broader
context may seek out the relationship between the criminal law
and the theories of a just and orderly society. To what extent are
criminal laws necessary for maintenance of order in society? How
does the criminal justice system influence the nature and extent
of any deviance from the prescribed social order?
One may turn to a theory of criminal justice for significantly
different reasons. Perhaps the reader is looking not for a perspec-
tive, that is a broad vista, but for a description of the existing
criminal law and an explanation for why it works the way it does.
Jerome Hall suggests that indeed one of the functions of a theory
of criminal law is "to elucidate certain basic ideas and organize the
criminal laws." 2 The reader searching for a descriptive-explanatory
approach imposes different criteria on an author. Such a reader
seeks a theoretical approach which comprehends the existing body
of knowledge by synthesizing, clarifying, and at times simplifying.
Utilizing this approach, the theorist may also delineate significant
issues for the reader without attempting to provide answers. Ide-
ally, the reader should be able to determine where existing theories
are unable to provide satisfactory answers.
Hyman Gross in his new book; A Theory of Criminal Justice,'
has taken a descriptive-explanatory rather than jurisprudential
* Associate Professor of Law, College of Law, West Virginia University.
J. HALL, GEEAL PamciF s OF CmMAL LAw 1 (2d ed. 1960) (footnote omit-
ted).
2 Id. at 2.
H. GRoss, A THEORY OF CRIMNAL JUSrICE (1979) (hereinafter cited as GRoss).
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approach to criminal justice. For the jurisprudential reader the
book will be a disappointment. The author cautions in the preface
that no attempt will be made to delineate the appropriate limits
of criminal law.4 The nonjurisprudential approach is further evi-
denced by the prefatory statement: "I do not invent a conception
of criminal justice but discover it in the principles that are gener-
ally aimed at by the criminal law in every civilized society of a
more or less liberal democratic complexion."'
Since A Theory of Criminal Justice is a comprehensive survey
of substantive criminal law theory, it is difficult to review the
work. The organization of A Theory of Criminal Justice is tradi-
tional from cover to cover and consequently leaves little to excite
either the knowledgeable lawyer or lay reader. The book opens
with the introductory chapter "Conceiving Criminal Justice" in
which Gross attempts to deal with the broader jurisprudential
issue. The following chapters cover criminal acts, culpability, in-
tention and motive, harm and attempts, exculpation, and excuses.
In Chapters Nine and Ten, Gross returns to the jurisprudence of
criminal punishment and provides the reader with the best work
of the entire book.6
A survey of the discussion of criminal acts and dangerousness
will provide the reader with a representive view of the merits of the
substantive aspects of the book. As a prelude to the survey of the
"act" requirement in criminal law, Gross considers whether crimi-
nal justice should attend to socially "dangerous" persons., If the
purpose of the criminal law is to maintain order in society, will that
goal not be served by removal of individuals who endanger the lives
of others and their property? Gross deals with this issue (and oth-
ers throughout the book) by confusing rather than synthesizing
what we already know about dangerousness. He begins by describ-
I GROSS, Preface at xvi. Professor Gross also notes that the book will not take
up issues involving law enforcement and criminal trial procedure. Id.
I Id. at xv. Compare Professor Gross's statement in the text with the following
caution of Jerome Hall:
[L]egal theory and jurisprudence apply uniformly within a specified
area. That area should be enlarged so far as is compatible with theory,
and any theory is always subject to displacement by a better one. ...
But no mere assemblage of occasional uniformities, historical qualifica-
tions and practice exceptions can function as a theory.
J. HALL, STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND CRIMINAL THEORY 17 (1958).
1 The literature on punishment is voluminous. The reader interested in recent
works in this area might see A. HmsH, DOING JusTIcE (1976) and E. VAN DEN HAAG,
PUNISHING CRIMINALS (1975).
1 GROSS at 34-47.
[Vol. 81
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ing "the popular view" which he ascribes to those who believe that
that the criminal justice system helps to ferret dangerous people
out of society.8 Gross contends that this concept is inaccurate be-
cause the majority of crimes are committed by non-dangerous per-
sons. In fact, "[tihe criminal law does not distinguish between
those who are dangerous and those who are not; and though it
allows room for prosecutors and judges to exercise some discretion
in this regard, it subjects equally to criminal liability those persons
who are criminal hazards and those who are not.9 Moreover, the
criminal law fails to promote this popular view since there are no
proven means of correction which can be applied to the dangerous
person," and we often incarcerate those who are guilty of crimes
but not dangerous."
With a variety of arguments, Gross is able to show that the
present criminal justice system is not preventive or protective but
reactive. Would it be possible to "instead adopt procedures de-
signed to identify, sequester, and correct criminally dangerous per-
sons"? Gross shows that the reactive nature of criminal law is a
function of our commitment to egalitarian ideals and the inability
to distinguish and diagnose criminal personalities.'
3
The treatment of dangerousness is flawed in two minor re-
spects. Gross seems to suggest that while the criminal law cannot
prevent harm to society, dangerous people can be civilly commit-
ted." Civil commitment statutes in virtually every state, including
West Virginia," preclude any such idea. Involuntary commitment
of dangerous persons is based on the presence of mental illness.
Consequently, a person must be mentally ill and dangerous before
civil commitment is permitted.
Finally, Gross offers the suggestion that one other method for
dealing with dangerous persons is to bring them back within the
Id. at 34-35.
Id. at 37.
, For a provocative view on a class of criminal actors who are truly dangerous,
see Batt, The New Outlaw:.A Psychological Footnote to the Criminal Law, 52 Ky.
L.J. 497 (1964).
" Gnoss at 39.
, Id. at 41.
" Id. at 42-45.
" Id. at 45.
" See, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 27-5-1 to 9 (Cum. Supp. 1978). Section 27-5-4(a),
for example, requires that the usual application for involuntary hospitalization not
only allege that a person has "symptoms of mental illness," but also that the
"individual is likely to cause serious harm to himself or others."
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community "by education and by having made available to them
attractive opportunities in society as a rational inducement to live
by its rules."" This remark suggests a fundamentally different
approach to dealing with criminals but provides no details as to
how it can be achieved. A Marxist socialist critic of the criminal
justice system would undoubtedly seize on the absence of
"attractive opportunities in society" as a significant inducement
to commit crime. It is unclear whether Gross would be receptive
to this Marxist view of crime in society.
Gross begins Chapter Two with some interesting and thought-
ful questions about the nature of conduct that we label criminal."?
The problem lies in the straw arguments Gross sets up to attack.
Whereas in Chapter One, the straw argument is '!the popular
view" which sees the criminal justice system as a means of dealing
with socially dangerous persons, in Chapter Two it is the
"orthodox" view that a criminal act is body movement. While
there is little argument today by modem theorists to confine crimi-
nal acts to body movements, Gross devotes six pages to rebutting
the argument.
While Gross purports to provide a better understanding of
criminal acts,'" he actually confuses the issue. Turning our atten-
tion away from acts viewed as body movements, Gross asks what
else an act might be. "The answer," Gross replies, "makes princi-
ples of responsibility fundamental and insists that acts are what-
ever satisfy certain basic requirements under these principles....
More particularly, an act consists of events or states of affairs for
which a person might be responsible according to the principles of
responsibility that guide such judgments; and so an act has taken
place when such events occur or when such states of affairs
exist."' 9 In the redefinition of "act," Gross displays an overblown
writing style and analysis common throughout the book. The
quoted passage, in addition to being less than clear-cut, shows a
penchant for verbiage. Of greater concern is the analytical effort.
"Act" has been so thoroughly refashioned that Gross takes the
word and the concept far beyond what it will bear. To call an "act"
a "state of affairs" confuses the ordinary meaning.
The crime of possession poses a problem in devising a concept
of criminal "acts." Gross again finds it convenient to devise a new
" GRoss at 47.
' Id. at 48-49.
" Id. at 55.
, Id. at 56.
[Vol. 81
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class of "acts" which constitute responsibility for a "state of af-
fairs."2 Gross contends that the "embarrassment" of the orthodox
theorist faced with reconciling a theory of criminal acts with crimi-
nal omissions and crimes like possession "disappears immediately
once he [the theorist] forms a conception of an act that genuinely
suits the purposes of his theory."'2' At this point it is hard to deter-
mine what theory of acts the author is promoting and, for that
matter, the significance of criminal acts which fit the theory. Gross
has failed to provide an adequate conceptualization of acts which
become crimes or a theory to delineate the overall purpose of such
a concept.
While recognizing the need to reconceptualize the act element
of criminal conduct, which together with mens rea, forms the cru-
cial foundational elements underlying our substantive criminal
law, Gross fails to see the theoretical consequences of the tradi-
tional act requirement." By rigidly staying within the boundaries
of traditional criminal law theory, and by merely redefining in-
stead of designing a more radical critique, A Theory of Criminal
Justice serves less as a theory of criminal justice than as a justifica-
tion for existing theories.
The chapter on culpability, intention and motive is better
organized and brings some understanding to a potentially confus-
ing subject. To elucidate the subject, Gross describes four dimen-
sions of culpability: intentionality, harm, dangerousness, and le-
2 Id. at 66.
21 Id.
" Professor Henry Seney made the following obervation:
Our focus on "conduct" or "act" has produced several unfortunate
results: It has resulted in a corresponding myopic concentration on the
individual, which has, in application, meant primarily lower-class indi-
viduals; it permits criminalization of conduct which a clear harm focus
would not tolerate (consensual crimes) and thus makes possible the forci-
ble imposition of moral standards which may be little more than class
prejudice-and often historical rather than contemporary class prejudice;
it permits criminal law to wander far from its job of protecting individu-
als, groups and society against specific harms; it concentrates on positive
activity, minimizing attention to omissions and thus frustrating develop-
ment of a system of positive geared-to-power duties to reduce or minimize
harms; and finally, the focus on acts gives an arbitrary flavor to the
criminal law, since it produces legislation phrased in terms of "Do not
do X" rather than in terms of "Mimimize X harm," which would auto-
matically supply the reason for the criminalization as well as simplifying
the content of a deprivational code. Seney, The Sibyl at Cumae-Our
Criminal Law's Moral Obsolescence, 17 WAYNE L. Rzv. 777, 829-30 (foot-
notes omitted).
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gitimacy of conduct. He then uses a helpful example of a sailor's
death which results from fumigation of a ship to illustrate each of
the four dimensions." The remainder of the chapter is of varied
quality. While there is an adequate treatment of "motive,"2 the
distinction between general and specific intent is given summary
treatment.? This short discussion of a perplexing concept may be
a result of Gross's view that intent is not a mental state but rather
a function of the criminal act. Gross conceptualizes specific intent
as bearing on the descriptive detail of the prohibited act and the
seriousness of harm threatened by the act. In this view specific
intent is not a legislative prescription for a particular mental state
but a statement about the criminal act.
Upon reading A Theory of Criminal Justice one is left with a
feeling of disquietude. The work is comprehensive, reflecting a
thorough understanding of the theoretical aspects of substantive
criminal law, and, in a few instances, providing a measure of con-
ceptual clarity to areas of the criminal law which are traditionally
muddled. Yet, where is the promised "theory" of criminal justice?
If the "theory" is to be found in the present maze of principles
which support our present criminal justice system," then Gross has
failed to make that obvious. The book goes to great lengths to
explore the conceptual labyrinth of criminal law but ultimately
fails to show the way to a more enlightened system or even "a
theory of criminal justice." The reader is left with a lofty and at
times annoyingly abstract discussion of theories which can be uti-
lized to justify the traditional conceptual framework of criminal
law; A Theory of Criminal Justice succeeds only if it is read as a
primer to criminal law theory.
2 GROss at 83-87.
24 Id. at 103-13.
2 If mens rea is, as Jerome Hall contends, the principle for "ultimate evalua-
tion of criminal conduct," then a theory of criminal justice must pay particular
attention to the concept. HALL, supra note 1, at 70.
The importance of mens rea in constructing a new theory of criminal justice
takes on renewed significance in light of the following assertion:
ETihe current mens rea system is long out of touch with social realities;
rests on an obsolete model of the human personality; appeals for justifica-
tion to faith rather than to empirical evidence; ignores important social
harms; fails either to identify or to investigate the major factors contrib-
uting to social harms; and perhaps most importantly, it just doesn't work
to reduce harm.
Seney, supra note 22, at 822.
" GRoss at 101.
21 See note 5 supra.
[Vol. 81
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The feeling of uneasiness as one tries to work through the book
is exacerbated by the author's writing style. Gross rarely uses ex-
amples to illustrate the theories which he describes, an omission
which is particularly egregious in light of the theoretical nature of
the work. A Theory of Criminal Justice is not a book to be read
from cover to cover.
The construction of a theory of justice is not a simple task.
The obstacles to formulating an adequate theory are numerous.
First, it is difficult to escape the temptation to accept the existing
criminal justice system and to present theories of substantive
criminal law as a starting point, in which case the theory merely
serves to explain and justify orthodox and traditional notions of
criminal law. An adequate theory of criminal justice must be
founded on an.understanding of:
the current activities which are presently labeled crimes, that
is, what are we criminalizing and with what effect;
the process for determining what to criminalize;
the values served and disserved by criminalization and punish-
ment;
the major harm producers in society and the nature of the inter-
est affected by their harmful behavior and activities;
the nature of punishment;
the moral basis for social control of individual behavior.
A Theory of Criminal Justice provides no coherent theory founded
on these fundamental elements.
Ultimately, A Theory of Criminal Justice fails because of the
absence of a unifying perspective. Gross writes about the principles
and theory of criminal law without resort to history,' psychology,
sociology, philosophy,29 or comparative law. As a result, A Theory
of Criminal Justice is far less successful than a comparable work
by Professor George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law."0
Fletcher's Rethinking Criminal Law escapes the airy abstract-
' For examples of the use of historical perspective in constructing or explain-
ing criminal law theory, see G. FErCHER, RrHDNG CmMmNAL LAw (1978); Elkins,
Corporations and the Criminal Law: An Uneasy Alliance, 65 KY. L.J. 73 (1976).
" George Fletcher in Rrmiu o CRIumNAL LAW contends:
Criminal law is a species of political and moral philosophy. Its central
question is justifying the use of the state's coercive power against free and
autonomous persons. The link with moral philosophy derives from one
answer to the problem of justifying the use of state power.
G. FLzrcHm, PRrHINUG CuRaAL LAw xix (1978).
3 Id.
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ness of A Theory of Criminal Justice by premising the philosophi-
cal discussion on the "concrete and technical details about lar-
ceny, burglary, attempts and homicide."'" With a sound basis in
narrowly circumscribed criminal activity-0 pages on theft
alone-Fletcher allows "[gleneral propositions [to] emerge from
these details but slowly."3 Fletcher, unlike Gross, relies heavily on
the development of theory as reflected in the common law.
In A Theory of Criminal Justice the doctrinal underpinning of
the criminal law is elevated to a position of primary importance.
Gross simply ignores the judicial struggle with substantive crimi-
nal law theory. Moreover, he does not explain this choice to over-
look the judicial gloss on legal theory.
As a critical perspective on the principles of criminal law, A
Theory of Criminal Justice provides no real insight and fails to
furnish a "functional, value-impact stable-cleaning."33 A rare but
creative effort at such a stable-cleaning was attempted by the late
Professor Henry Seney.1 Seney argued that the term "criminal"
itself was of no future use: "Its circumambient connotations, ster-
eotypes and prejudices clog our thinking."' '
A Theory of Criminal Justice by its structure suggests the
possibility of theorizing about criminal law without ever looking at
crime in society. The very nature of "crimes" and "criminals" is
lost in the rhetoric of theory.38 Gross has the unique ability to talk
31 Id. at xxii.
12 Id. at xxii.
13 Seney, supra note 22, at 778. George Fletcher argues that the refinement of
American criminal law and its underlying theory has been inhibited by the prevail-
ing utilitarian theory of sanction, the emphasis on identification and confinement
of potentially dangerous offenders and increased reliance on prosecutorial and judi-
cial discretion. G. FizrcHER, supra note 29, at xx.
m For a tribute to Henry Seney upon his death, see Editor's Note, 15 DuQ. L.
Ray. 161 (1976-77) and Peleaz, Henry W. Seney, 15 DuQ. L. Rav. 163 (1976-77).
Seney's work on the criminal law is a truly ambitious effort; appearing in the
Wayne Law Review over a three-year period, it provides a thoroughgoing radical
critique of the substantive criminal law. See Seney, supra note 22; Seney, "A Pond
As Deep As Hell"-Harm, Danger, and Dangerousness in Our Criminal Law, Part
1, 17 WAYNE L. REv. 1095 (1971), Part I, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 569 (1972); Seney,
"When Empty Terrors Overawe"-Our Criminal Law Defenses, Part I, 19 WAYNE
L. REv. 947 (1973), Part II, 19 WAYNE L. REv. 1359 (1973), Part III, 20 WAYNE L.
Rav. 41 (1973), Part IV, 20 WAYNE L. Rav. 1269 (1973).
- Seney, supra note 22, at 785.
3' In describing the author's approach as a "rhetoric of theory" I mean no
disparagement of recent efforts to create a new rhetoric for understanding criminal
law and procedure. See White, Making Sense of the Criminal Law, 50 U. CoLo. L.
[Vol. 81
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about criminal law as if it had nothing to do with crime and crimi-
nals. In contrast Seney's work emphasizes the social interactive
setting in which crime takes place.
Professor Seney was a rare criminal law theorist who recog-
nized the misdirected emphasis of our criminal law on the individ-
ual which ignores criminal misconduct by organizations.37 Seney
points out that:
The harms which happen to people have changed dramatically
in kind, scope and seriousness from those early days when law-
making and enforcing people feared lower class individualistic
transactions involving physical strength, crude weapons and
enough guts to use them. Most important physical and eco-
nomic harm are no longer the product of individualistic inter-
actions; they are organizational. Yet we still concentrate our
moralistic, futile and counter-productive efforts on these rela-
tively minor, face to face encounters, and on their lower-class,
individual, scapegoat, perpetrators.n
He adds:
[O]ur inherited categories of crime are largely unrelated to the
major harms of a complex technological society. These crime
categories unequally condemn, and unequally focus law en-
forcement resources and public attention on lower-class depriv-




In the rarified theory of Gross's work, there is no reference to
the problem of the criminal conduct of corporate entities. 0 By
ignoring actual social harms which result from criminal conduct,
Gross is unable to provide a theory of criminal justice which re-
flects social as well as theoretical realities.
Gross, unlike Seney, does not force the reader to ask of crimi-
nal law theory "what difference it makes to society, what problems
REv. 1 (1978); The Fourth Amendment As a Way of Talking About People: A Study
of Robinson and Matlock, 1974 Sup. CT. Rav. 165. White develops his approach to
rhetoric more fully in J. Wim, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973).
31 Seney, supra note 22, at 801-06.
"Id. at 854.
nId. at 857.
40 For a comprehensive account of the imposition of criminal sanctions on
corporations, see Elkins, Corporations and the Criminal Law: An Uneasy Alliance,
65 Ky. L.J. 73 (1976). See generally, L. LEIGH, THE CRIMINAL LIALrrY OF CORPORA-
TIONS IN ENGLISH LAW (1969); W. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN A CHANGING Socirm 207-212
(1972).
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it creates or solves, and what effects it has on which values."',
Gross is content to dabble with-theories without confronting the
value impact of the criminal law or questioning the gross disparity
of substantive criminal justice in our society."2
' Seney, supra note 22, at 778.
In Chapter Four, Professor Gross informs the reader that in discussing the
notion of harm as a part of criminal conduct the "normative questions" will not be
addressed. GROss at 115. Normative questions "are the questions of which activities
the criminal law ought to make its business, and which it ought to regard as none
of its business." Id.
10
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